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Oil Spills and Dishonesty: Did BP Commit Securities Fraud 
Regarding Pipeline Leaks in Alaska? 
 







In Reese v. Malone, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals revived a 
class action securities fraud suit against BP.  The court overturned the 
district court’s finding and held that statements made by BP and its 
executives in the wake of two separate oil pipeline leaks in Alaska were 
actionable as being intentionally misleading.  The court held that all but 
one of the statements at issue had the potential to mislead the public and, 
more specifically, BP’s investors.  While BP has already been found 
criminally and civilly liable for the harm that these oil spills caused to the 
environment, BP will again face civil liability for its alleged attempts to 
conceal its degree of fault in causing and allowing that harm to occur. 
 
II. FACTS AND HOLDING 
 
Appellants are BP shareholders (“Appellants”), who filed a class 
action suit against BP; BP Exploration Alaska (“BP-Alaska”), an Alaska-
based, wholly-owned subsidiary of BP; John Browne, BP's CEO during the 
class period; and Maureen Johnson, who was BP-Alaska's Senior Vice 
President during the class period.2  Appellants' action is based on two oil 
spills from leaks in separate oil pipelines operated by BP-Alaska in the 
Prudhoe Bay area of northern Alaska.3  The first spill was discovered on 
March 2, 2006, coming from a hole in the Western Operating Area (“WOA”) 
line.4  It is estimated the leak went undetected for at least five days, and 
                                                
1 Reese v. Malone, 747 F.3d 557 (9th Cir. 2014). 
2 Id. at 563. 
3 Id. 
4 Id. at 564. 
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spilled approximately 4,800 barrels of oil onto Alaskan tundra.5  In August of 
the same year, the second spill was detected as another twenty-five barrels of 
oil leaked from the Eastern Operating Area (“EOA”) line on the opposite side 
of Prudhoe Bay.6  As a result, BP temporarily shut down operations in the 
Prudhoe Bay oil field.7 
 
Both spills were the result of internal corrosion in the WOA and EOA 
pipelines, which BP knew to have similar characteristics that caused them to 
have the same high level of risk for corrosion.8  The main process of pipeline 
maintenance in the oil and gas industries is known as “pigging,” in which a 
cleaning tool is sent through the line.9  “Smart pigging” is a process used to 
detect the presence of corrosion and cracks in the pipeline.10  BP eventually 
admitted that it pigged its Prudhoe Bay lines infrequently, at a rate 
significantly below industry standards for that type of pipeline, and used less 
accurate methods of monitoring for internal corrosion.11  Investigations 
revealed that BP had not tested the WOA's integrity with a smart pig since 
1998,12 nor the EOA since 1990.13 
 
On March 15, 2006, the U.S. Department of Transportation Pipeline 
and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (“PHMSA”) issued a 
Corrective Action Order (“CAO”) to BP-Alaska, addressed to Maureen 
Johnson, Vice President of BP-Alaska, as well as the Greater Prudhoe Bay 
Performance Unit Leader.14  The CAO's preliminary findings identified 
multiple additional spots with severe corrosion, including one area with only 
0.04 inches of wall remaining, and also noted the similarities in conditions 




8 Id. at 566.  These factors included low crude oil flow velocities, corrosivity of the 
material being transported, the presence of water and sediments, and lack of or 
ineffective maintenance.  Id. 
9 Id. at 563. 
10 Id. at 563-64. 
11 Id. at 564. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. at 573. 
14 Id. at 564. 
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and risks for corrosion between all three of BP's Prudhoe Bay pipelines.15  
The CAO stated that “'continued operation of BP's WOA, EOA, and Lisburne 
hazardous liquid pipelines without corrective measures would be hazardous 
to life, property and the environment,'” and ordered, among other things, that 
BP smart pig all three lines within certain deadlines.16  BP's inspection of the 
EOA line (which missed its deadline by a month and was completed only two 
weeks before the second spill) revealed numerous severely corroded areas in 
that line as well.17 
 
Following the second spill, in 2007, BP-Alaska pled guilty to a 
violation of the Clean Water Act, agreeing to pay a $20 million fine.18  In the 
plea agreement, BP admitted that it was aware of corrosion in the WOA 
pipeline in 2005, the company's “'insufficient inspection data'” on the EOA 
line, and the risk factors for corrosion in both lines.19  In 2011, BP settled 
civil suits brought by the Department of Justice and the State of Alaska, 
agreeing to pay $25 million in damages and to make $60 million in 
improvements to its pipelines in Alaska.20 
 
In the instant case, appellants allege that BP knowingly, or with 
deliberate recklessness, made false and misleading statements about the 
condition of its pipelines, and its pipeline maintenance and leak detection 
practices, prior to and after the first spill.21  Appellants seek relief under the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 for investment losses incurred when the 
spills and subsequent shutdown allegedly caused a significant decline in BP's 
share price.22  The shareholders' appeal focuses on four types of false or 
misleading statements: (1) a press statement made by Maureen Johnson two 
weeks after the March spill that stated inspection data from prior to the spill 
indicated that corrosion was occurring at a low and manageable rate; (2) two 
press statements by Johnson suggesting that the first spill was anomalous and 
distinguishing the WOA line from the others in Prudhoe Bay; (3) a press 
statement by BP's CEO John Browne that the March spill occurred “'in spite 
                                                
15 Id. at 564-65. 
16 Id. at 565. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. at 566. 
19 Id. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. at 563. 
22 Id. 
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of the fact that [BP] has both world class corrosion monitoring and leak 
detection systems'”; and (4) a statement in BP's 2005 Annual Report (which 
was issued in June of 2006)23 stating that management believed BP was in 
compliance, in all material respects, with applicable environmental laws and 
regulations.24 
 
Appellees argue that Johnson, Browne, and other BP executives made 
those statements, not with the intent to mislead or deceive investors, but 
because they misunderstood or did not have access to BP's data,25 and 
because some of the data was incomplete.26  As to the statement in the annual 
report, Appellees argue that it was not intentionally false or misleading 
because the report used the phrases “'management believes,'” and 
“'compliance in all material respects'” (emphasis added).27 
 
Initially, the trial court granted in part and denied in part Appellees' 
motion to dismiss, finding that only one of twenty-five allegedly false and 
misleading statements was actionable under the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934.28  On interlocutory appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court reversed, 
concluding that the statement was not false or misleading.29  Appellants 
amended their complaint to include several facts and allegations, based on 
information that came to light during the investigations and lawsuits arising 
from the spills.30  The trial court dismissed the amended complaint in its 
entirety, with prejudice, for failure to state a claim.31  It found that, while 
some of Appellees' statements were actionably false, Appellants did not plead 
facts giving rise to a strong inference of scienter.32 
                                                
23 Id. at 569, 572-73, 577. 
24 Id. at 567. 
25 Id. at 571. 
26 Id. at 573. 
27 Id. at 578-79. 
28 Id. at 566. 
29 Id.; See Reese v. BP Exploration (Alaska) Inc., 643 F.3d 681 (9th Cir. 2011). 
30 Reese, 747 F.3d at 567. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. 
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On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part, 
remanding the case back to the trial court.33  The instant court agreed with the 
trial court that the statement made by Browne34 was not actionable,35 but held 
that the other three types of statements36 were.37  The court ultimately held 
that a securities fraud claim is adequately pled, with respect to the elements 
of material falsity and scienter (which are required to state a securities fraud 
claim),38 when the complaint specifies each statement alleged to have been 
false or misleading and the reasons why it is so,39 and suffices to raise a 
reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence satisfying the 
materiality requirement.40 When the complaint states with particularity facts, 
that when taken together and reviewed holistically, give rise to a strong 
inference that the defendant acted with scienter, this inference is at least as 
compelling as any opposing inference of non-fraudulent intent.41 
 
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
 
Appellants' complaint arises in part under § 10(b) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, which makes it unlawful “[t]o use or employ, in 
connection with the purchase of any security . . . any manipulative or 
deceptive device or contrivance . . . .”42  The complaint also arises under Rule 
10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which was promulgated by the 
                                                
33 Id. at 581. 
34 I.e. the press statement by BP's CEO John Browne that the March spill occurred “'in 
spite of the fact that [BP] has both world class corrosion monitoring and leak detection 
systems.'” Id. at 577. 
35 Id. at 577. 
36 I.e. the press statement made by Maureen Johnson two weeks after the March spill that 
stated inspection data from prior to the spill indicated that corrosion was occurring at a 
low and manageable rate; the two press statements by Johnson suggesting that the first 
spill was anomalous and distinguishing the WOA line from the others in Prudhoe Bay; 
and the statement in BP's 2005 Annual Report stating that management believed BP was 
in compliance, in all material respects, with applicable environmental laws and 
regulations. Id. at 59, 573-73, 577. 
37 Id. at 577, 581. 
38 Id. at 567 (citing Thompson v. Paul, 547 F.3d 1055, 1061 (9th Cir. 2008)). 
39 Id. at 568 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1)(B) (2012)). 
40 Id. (citing Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 131 S. Ct. 1309, 1323 (2011)). 
41 Id. at 568-69 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2)(A) (2012); Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues 
& Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007); Matrixx Initiatives, Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 1324). 
42 747 F.3d at 563; 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012). 
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Securities and Exchange Commission.43  Similar to §10(b), Rule 10b-5 
makes it unlawful “[t]o make any untrue statement of a material fact or to 
omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, 
in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not 
misleading.”44  The Supreme Court of the United States has established that 
to state a claim of securities fraud, a plaintiff must plead: “(1) a material 
misrepresentation or omission by the defendant; (2) scienter; (3) a connection 
between the misrepresentation or omission and the purchase or sale of a 
security; (4) reliance upon the misrepresentation or omission; (5) economic 
loss; and (6) loss causation.”45 
 
At the pleading stage of claims under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, a 
complaint must satisfy the dual pleading requirements of Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 9(b) and the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act 
(“PSLRA”).46  Rule 9(b) requires that claims alleging fraud be subject to a 
heightened pleading requirement. As such, a party must “state with 
particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.”47  In addition, 
private securities fraud complaints are subject to the requirements of the 
PSLRA which requires that such a complaint plead with particularity both 
falsity and scienter.48  As a result, the two issues reached in the instant case 
were whether the appellants' complaint had adequately pled (i.e. with 
particularity) material falsity and scienter.49 
 
A. Falsity and Materiality 
 
In order to plead falsity, a complaint must “specify each statement 
alleged to have been misleading, [and] the reason why the statement is 
                                                
43 Reese, 747 F.3d at 567 (citing 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b)).  
44 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b) (2014). 
45 Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 157 (2008). 
46 Reese, 747 F.3d at 568 (citing In re VeriFone Holdings, Inc. Sec. Litig., 704 F.3d 694, 
701 (9th Cir. 2012)). 
47 Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). 
48 Reese, 747 F.3d at 568 (citing Zucco Partners, LLC v. Digimarc Corp., 552 F.3d 981, 
990 (9th Cir. 2009)). 
49 Id. at 568-69. 
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misleading.”50  If an allegation regarding the statement or omission is made 
on information and belief, the complaint must “state with particularity all 
facts on which that belief is formed.”51  Such a statement of belief is a 
“'factual' misstatement actionable under Section 10(b) if (1) the statement is 
not actually believed, (2) there is no reasonable basis for the belief, or (3) the 
speaker is aware of undisclosed facts tending seriously to undermine the 
statement's accuracy.”52 
 
In Glazer Capital Mgmt. v. Magistri, the court held that statements of 
legal compliance are adequately pled with regards to falsity when a 
complaint references documents detailing specific violations of law that 
existed at the time the warranties were made.53  In Glazer, the court held that 
a statement averring “compliance in all material respects” was actionably 
false because the complaint pointed to an SEC cease and desist order 
detailing violations of law, even though the order was issued eleven months 
after the statement was made.54  Courts have also held that statements are 
misleading, and thus actionable, when they create the idea of certainty in a 
situation that previously indicated risk.55  For example, in Berson v. Applied 
Signal Tech, Inc., the court stated that “[i]t goes without saying that investors 
would treat [risk and certainty] differently.”56 
 
In addition to falsity, the materiality of a misrepresentation or 
omission of fact is central to a 10b-5 claim.57  A statement is material when 
there is “a substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact would 
have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered 
                                                
50 15 U.S.C. § 78u(b)(1)(B) (2012). 
51 Id. 
52 Kaplan v. Rose, 49 F.3d 1363, 1375 (9th Cir. 1994). 
53 Glazer, 549 F.3d 736, 741-42 (9th Cir. 2008). 
54 Id. 
55 See, e.g., Berson v. Applied Signal Tech., Inc., 527 F.3d 982, 987 (9th Cir. 2008). 
56 Id.  In Berson, the court held that, in a claim of violations of Securities and Exchange 
Act § 10(b) and 10b-5 for losses allegedly incurred due to a company’s misleading 
practice of counting as “backlog” contracted work not yet performed but for which the 
dollar value was reported, without disclosing that backlog included millions of dollars of 
halted contract work for which stop-work orders had been issued, the reporting of 
backlog would have misled reasonable investors.  Id. at 984-87. 
57 Reese, 747 F.3d at 568 (citing In re Cutera Sec. Litig., 610 F.3d 1103, 1108 (9th Cir. 
2010)). 
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the 'total mix' of information made available.”58  In order to adequately plead 
materiality, a complaint's allegations must suffice to “'raise a reasonable 
expectation that discovery will reveal evidence' satisfying the materiality 
requirement,”59 and “'allow the court to draw the reasonable inference [of 
liability].'”60  Conclusory allegations of law and spurious inferences are not 
enough to defeat a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.61 
 
Facts demonstrating public interest in withheld information support 
the information's materiality.62  In In re 2themart.com, Inc. Sec. Litig., the 
court found that public interest in the company's website development on an 




Scienter is defined as a mental state of intent to deceive, manipulate, 
or defraud.64  For a complaint to adequately plead scienter, it must “state with 
particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted 
with the required state of mind.”65  In Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, 
Ltd., a class action suit brought by investors alleging securities fraud, the 
Supreme Court set forth an analysis for determining whether a complaint 
gives rise to a strong inference of scienter, specifically when reviewing a 
Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.66 
 
Under the Tellabs analysis, a court must accept a complaint's factual 
allegations as true, and must consider the complaint in its entirety, including 
                                                
58 Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231-32 (1976) (quoting TSC Indus., Inc. v. 
Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976)). 
59 Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 131 S. Ct. 1309, 1323 (2011) (quoting Bell 
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.  544, 556 (2007)). 
60 Id. (quoting Aschroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2008)). 
61 In re Cutera Sec. Litig., 610 F.3d 1103, 1108 (9th Circ. 2010).  
62 In re 2themart.com, Inc. Sec. Litig., 114 F. Supp. 2d 955, 961 (C.D. Ca. 2000). 
63 Id. (the court held that, in deciding whether materiality has been adequately pled in a 
Securities and Exchange Act § 10 b-5 claim, public interest in the company’s website 
development on an online message board was evidence of materiality). Id. 
64 Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 n. 12 (1976). 
65 15 U.S.C. §  78u-4(b)(2)(A) (2012). 
66 See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, LTD.,et al., 551 U.S. 308 (2007). 
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documents incorporated into the complaint by reference, as well as matters of 
which a court may take judicial notice.67  The court must review all of the 
allegations holistically to determine whether scienter is adequately pled.68 
The key question is “whether all of the facts alleged, taken collectively, give 
rise to a strong inference of scienter, not whether any individual allegation, 
scrutinized in isolation, meets that standard.”69  In this analysis, a strong 
inference of scienter need not be irrefutable, but “must be more than merely 
plausible or reasonable — it must be cogent and at least as compelling as any 
opposing inference of non-fraudulent intent.”70  In other words, the court 
must weigh inferences of scienter against plausible, nonculpable explanations 
for the defendant's conduct.71 
 
To satisfy the scienter requirement, it must be inferred that the 
defendant made false or misleading statements “'either intentionally or with 
deliberate recklessness.'”72  In the context of securities fraud, an actor is 
deliberately reckless “'if he had reasonable grounds to believe material facts 
existed that were misstated or omitted, but nonetheless failed to obtain or 
disclose such facts although he could have done so without extraordinary 
effort.'”73  Evidence, such as internal documents or disclosures, of an actor's 
contemporaneous knowledge of facts, which shows her statements to be false 
or misleading, is the most direct way to create a strong inference of 
scienter.74  For example, if an actor directly references relevant data that is 
contradictory to her statements, or if the complaint makes detailed and 
specific allegations about management's exposure to factual information 
within the company, there is a strong inference of scienter.75  On the other 
hand, if the defendant can show that information was obscured from the actor 
or high-level executives, this can outweigh any inference of scienter.76  This 
                                                
67 Id. at 322. 
68 Id. at 309-10; Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siacusana, 131 S. Ct. 1309, 1324 (2011). 
69 Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 323. 
70 Id. at 309. 
71 Id. at 323-24. 
72 Zucco Partners, LLC v. Digimarc Corp., 552 F.3d 981, 991 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting In 
re Daou Sys., Inc., 411 F.3d 1006, 1014-15 (9th Cir. 2005)). 
73 Reese v. Malone, 747 F.3d 557, 569 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting In re Oracle Corp. Sec. 
Litig., 627 F.3d 376, 390 (9th Cir. 2010)). 
74 Id. at 572 (citing Nursing Home Pension Fund, Local 144 v. Oracle Corp., 380 F.3d 
1226, 1230 (9th Cir. 2004)). 
75 S. Ferry LP, No. 2 v. Killinger, 542 F.3d 776, 783, 785 (9th Cir. 2008). 
76 Glazer Capital Mgmt., LP v. Magistri, 549 F.3d 736, 746-47 (9th Cir. 2008).  
JOURNAL OF ENVTL. & SUSTAINABILITY LAW VOL. 22, NO. 1 
 143 
was the case in Glazer Capital Management, where there were no facts 
showing that the company’s CEO was personally aware of illegal activity 
within the company.77 
 
However, mere temporal proximity between the statements and later 
disclosures or documents is circumstantial evidence of scienter, and can only 
bolster the inference.78 Likewise, facts showing mere recklessness or a 
motive and opportunity to commit fraud provide some reasonable inference 
of intent and should be considered as part of the totality of the circumstances, 
but are not independently sufficient to create a strong inference of scienter.79 
 
In addition to allegations being viewed holistically, to create a strong 
inference of scienter under the Tellabs standard, allegations may help satisfy 
the PSLRA scienter requirement in two other circumstances.80  One of these 
circumstances is when the allegations are particular and suggest that the 
defendants had actual access to the disputed information.81  In In re Daou 
Systems, the Court held that the plaintiffs pled scienter based on specific 
allegations of the defendants' direct involvement in the making of false 
accounting statements and reports.82  In Nursing Home Pension Fund, Local 
144 v. Oracle, the Court held that it was reasonable to infer that the 
defendant-executives were aware of major accounting irregularities because 
of specific allegations regarding the executives' detail-oriented management 
style.83 
                                                
77 Id. at 745. 
78 Reese, 747 F.3d at 574-75.  See Ronconi v. Larkin, 253 F.3d 423, 437 (9th Cir. 2001). 
79 In re Silicon Graphics Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970, 974 (9th Cir. 1999).  See also 
Tellabs Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 319 (2007); see also In re 
Daou Systems, 411 F.3d 1006, 1024 (9th Cir. 2005). 
80 Reese, 747 F.3d 557, 575-76 (9th Cir. 2014).  
81 S. Ferry LP, No. 2 v. Killinger, 542 F.3d 776, 786 (9th Cir. 2008); See Nursing Home 
Pension Fund, Local 144 v. Oracle, 380 F.3d 1226, 1233-34 (9th Cir. 2004).  
82 Daou, 411 F.3d at 1023 (holding that, in deciding whether scienter has been adequately 
pled in a Securities and Exchange Act § 10(b) claim (i.e. whether allegations satisfy the 
PLSRA standard), plaintiffs’ making specific allegations of the defendants’ direct 
involvement in the making of false accounting statements and reports helped satisfy the 
standard because they were particular and suggested that the defendants had actual access 
to the disputed information). Id. 
83 Oracle, 380 F.3d at 1234 (holding that, in deciding whether scienter has been 
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In another circumstance, allegations may be sufficient to satisfy the 
PSLRA scienter requirement, without being particular, when the relevant 
facts are so prominent that it would be “absurd” to suggest management did 
not have knowledge of the matter.84  This is based off of the principle that it 
is often reasonable to conclude high-ranking corporate officers have 
knowledge of the critical core operations of their companies, and this “core 
operations inference” may be enough to raise a strong inference of scienter.85  
In Berson, the plaintiffs alleged no specific facts to demonstrate that 
individually named corporate officers (i.e. defendants) had actual knowledge 
about customers' stop-work orders on large contracts.86  These stop-work 
orders caused a significant drop in the defendant company's actual revenue, 
but continued to be counted as revenue via a misleading accounting trick, 
which formed the basis of the suit.87  Despite the lack of specific facts 
showing the officers' knowledge, the court held that there was a strong 
inference of scienter based on the officers' positions and the nature of the 
misstatements.88  The court held that the officers were “directly responsible 
for [the company's] day-to-day operations,” and the stop-work orders “were 
prominent enough that it would be 'absurd to suggest' that top management 
was unaware of them.”89 
 
IV. INSTANT DECISION 
 
In the instant case, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
analyzed separately whether falsity and scienter were adequately pled for 
each of the four statements at issue. 
 
 
                                                                                                                     
adequately pled in Securities and Exchange Act § 10(b) and 10 b-5 claims (i,e. whether 
allegations satisfy the PLSRA standard), it was reasonable to infer that the defendant-
executives were aware of major accounting irregularities because of specific allegations 
regarding the executives' detail-oriented management style, and that those allegations 
helped satisfy the standard because they were particular and suggested that the defendants 
had actual access to the disputed information). Id. 
84 Berson v. Applied Signal Tech., Inc., 527 F.3d 982, 988 (9th Cir. 2008).  
85 S. Ferry, 542 F.3d at 785-86. 
86 Berson, 527 F.3d at 987.  
87 Id. at 983. 
88 Id. at 987-88. 
89 Id. 
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A. Johnson's Assurances About the Low Manageable Corrosion Rate 
 
The court began by discussing the press statement made by BP-
Alaska's VP, Maureen Johnson, two weeks after the March spill, in which she 
stated corrosion had been seen in the WOA pipeline in a September 2005 
inspection, “'but appeared to be occurring at a “low manageable. . . . 
corrosion rate.”’”90 
 
In assessing falsity, the court considered the allegation that BP’s 
internal documents showed the corrosion rate in one tested area was 32 
mills91 per year (“MPY”) in 2005, compared to just 3 MPY in 2004.92  A rate 
above 30 MPY is the highest of three levels in BP's own classification 
system, and an expert for the Appellants opined that such a corrosion rate 
was “high” and “not manageable.”93  Appellees argued that Johnson's 
statement was simply incomplete because only one of many tested locations 
had a corrosion rate of 32 MPY.94 However, the court held Johnson's 
statement effectively denied that BP had any warning of high corrosion 
before the first spill, and was thus objectively misleading.95  BP's awareness 
of the corrosion level was a key question raised by media and government 
investigators, demonstrating public interest in the withheld information; the 
court held this supported the statement's materiality.96  As such, the court 
agreed with the trial court that the Appellants had adequately pled material 
falsity of this statement.97 
 
The larger issue is whether Appellants adequately pled Johnson's 
scienter.  The court noted Johnson was directly responsible for pipeline 
operations in Prudhoe Bay, and holds a Ph.D. in Environmental Science and 
Engineering.  Following the first spill, Johnson had every reason to review 
and understand BP's corrosion monitoring data to determine what happened 
                                                
90 Reese v. Malone, 747 F.3d 557, 569 (9th Cir. 2014). 
91 A mill is equal to one thousandth of an inch.  Id. 
92 Id. 
93 Id. 
94 Id. at 569-70. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. at 570. 
97 Id. at 569. 
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and assess the possibility of future spills.98  Based on this belief, the court 
held that if anyone knew of the deficiencies in BP's monitoring program and 
the likelihood of pipeline failures, it was Johnson.99  The complaint stated 
Johnson's involvement in working with government organizations to comply 
with the CAO, and her responsibility for reporting to BP executives about the 
first spill.100 Because BP's corrosion monitoring practices and the spill's 
preventability were the focus of public and government inquiries, the court 
held Johnson had a clear motive for omitting information about the presence 
of high corrosion levels.101  The court also held the appellants did not need to 
show Johnson had the intent to deceive investors about the likelihood of 
future spills, as the trial court found necessary, rather it was enough to show 
she had known her statement was materially misleading.102 
 
The Ninth Circuit Court then went on to discuss the Tellabs analysis 
conducted by the trial court, which concluded the inference that Johnson 
intended to mislead investors was outweighed by opposing inferences that 
she misunderstood or did not have access to BP's data.103  The instant court 
noted that in a Tellabs analysis, courts must only weigh plausible competing 
inferences.104  Because the detected corrosion levels were the highest in BP's 
classification system and had dramatically increased, and because of 
Johnson's role, the responsibilities of her position, and her expertise as a 
doctor of engineering, the court held that it was simply implausible that she 
had misunderstood BP's data.105  The fact that Johnson specifically addressed 
the corrosion data in her statement directly contradicts the inference that she 
did not have access to the data, making it implausible as well, according to 
the court.106  Thus, the court held that when considering the totality of the 
circumstances, the Appellants pled facts which created a strong inference of 
scienter that outweighed opposing inferences.107 
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B. Johnson's Statements Distinguishing the WOA and EOA Lines 
 
The court next looked at two press statements made by Johnson after 
the first spill. In the first statement, she stated the problems that caused the 
March spill were unique to the WOA line. In the other statement, she said 
that none of the other transit lines had the same combination of factors which 
contributed to the first spill, including bacteria within the pipeline and a low 
flow rate.108 
 
The court noted that after the second spill, BP-Alaska admitted to 
regulators the causal factors most influential to corrosion, including low flow 
velocity leading to microbiologically induced corrosion, were present in both 
the WOA and EOA lines.109  The court referenced two more documents from 
2006 and 2007 showing BP's acknowledgement that microbiologically 
induced corrosion was the cause of both spills, promoted by several similar 
characteristics of both lines, including low flow velocities and a lack of 
maintenance pigging.110  Based on those documents, the court held that the 
appellants had adequately pled the falsity of Johnson's statement.111 
 
Appellees argued that the statements were not false or materially 
misleading because they were based on BP-Alaska's preliminary assessments, 
which were subject to change.112  However, the statements do not imply that 
the findings were preliminary or incomplete, and the second statement 
indicates it was based on post-spill inspections.113  Because of this, and the 
fact that the complaint contained information suggesting BP was aware of the 
high risk of corrosion and the deficiencies in its monitoring and maintenance 
practices, the court rejected this argument.114  It also rejected the argument 
that the statements were not misleading because the public was aware of the 
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lines' similarities; the statements directly, and with certainty, contradicted the 
general similarities noted in the CAO.115 
 
Again, the more contentious issue was whether Johnson's scienter was 
pled adequately.  The trial court found it plausible that Johnson's statements 
only summarized preliminary results of an ongoing investigation, and that 
Appellants did not show Johnson was aware her statements were false.116  
The trial court dismissed each of the three documents contradicting Johnson's 
statements, and other information gleaned through discovery and admissions, 
as inconclusive evidence of scienter because the documents and information 
were dated after Johnson made her statements.117  The instant court noted 
that, although the subsequent statements and disclosures cannot, standing 
alone, establish scienter, they provide strong circumstantial evidence towards 
the inference of scienter considering the relatively constant, long-term nature 
of the information.118  Furthermore, the court stated there was nothing in the 
record to suggest that flow velocity or risk of corrosion were ever factors that 
differed between the WOA and EOA lines.119  Based on the circumstantial 
evidence, and the inference that key officers have knowledge of the “core 
operations” of a company, the court held it could impute scienter to Johnson 
given the totality of the circumstances.120 
 
The court engaged in further analyses expounding on the core 
operations inference.121 Due to Johnson's roles in overseeing pipeline 
operations in Prudhoe Bay and communicating directly with regulators, BP 
leadership, and the press after the March spill, the court concluded that 
Johnson appeared to have been both the external and internal gatekeeper of 
information on the Prudhoe Bay pipelines.122  In conducting an absurdity 
analysis, the court noted BP admitted to treating the pipelines identically for 
monitoring purposes based on their similarity, and that Johnson must have 
been aware of the lack of data on the EOA line because she would have to 
                                                
115 Id. at 573-74. 
116 Id. at 574. 
117 Id. 
118 Id. at 574-75. 
119 Id. at 575. 
120 Id. 
121 Id. 
122 Id. at 576. 
JOURNAL OF ENVTL. & SUSTAINABILITY LAW VOL. 22, NO. 1 
 149 
have known it had not been smart pigged in sixteen years.123  The court held 
such information is the epitome of “core” to pipeline operations in Prudhoe 
Bay, and the information it imputes to Johnson was fundamental to the 
operations of her business.124  Thus, the court concluded it is absurd to think 
Johnson was unaware of the information.125   
 
The court then conducted the “actual access” analysis, holding 
Johnson's statements were her own specific representations of the company's 
findings and reflect her access to the information at issue.126  Noting there is 
a stronger inference of scienter here than in situations where executives are 
held responsible for the falsity of accounting statements, the court held the 
actual access analysis supports scienter.127  The court concluded by holding 
that the absurdity and actual access analyses, as well as the totality of the 
circumstances under the Tellabs analysis, make the inference of scienter 
irresistible, and outweighs the opposing, speculative inference that Johnson 
was merely summarizing a preliminary investigation.128 
 
C. Statement Regarding BP's “World Class” Leak Detection and 
Corrosion Monitoring Systems 
 
Next, the court looked at the third statement type in the complaint, a 
press statement on April 25, 2006, by BP's CEO John Browne to the effect 
that the March spill occurred “in spite of the fact that [BP has] both world 
class corrosion monitoring and leak detection systems, both being applied 
within regulation set by the Alaskan authorities.”129  The court agreed with 
the trial court that the statement was false, as investigations revealed the 
pipelines were under-inspected, under-maintained, and had a severe risk of 
corrosion-related failure.130 
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The court also agreed with the district court that the appellants did not 
allege facts that independently created a strong inference of scienter based on 
the timing of the statement and the totality of the circumstances.131  The 
appellants did not set forth facts supporting the inference that Browne had 
actual access to contradictory information, because BP's Board of Directors 
did not receive a detailed update until ten days after Browne made the 
statement, and the CAO against BP-Alaska did not speak of specific legal 
violations.132  Accordingly, the instant court upheld the trial court with 
respect to Browne's statement.133 
 
D. Annual Report Statement Regarding Compliance with Environmental 
Laws and Regulations 
 
The final statement analyzed by the court was contained in BP's 2005 
annual report, which was issued on June 30, 2006: “Management believes 
that the Group's activities are in compliance in all material respects with 
applicable environmental laws and regulations.”134 
 
The court noted that statements of legal compliance are pled with 
adequate falsity when documents detail specific violations of law existing at 
the time the warranties were made.135  The court held the appellants' 
complaint cited evidence of a number of violations of environmental laws 
and regulations, including the Clean Water Act (evidenced by BP's 2007 
guilty plea), Alaskan laws (evidenced by BP's civil settlement with the state), 
and pipeline safety laws (evidenced by BP-Alaska's failure to comply with 
PHMSA's COA).136  The court also held that, while the company may have 
shown some effort to achieve compliance after the March spill, that effort 
could not negate the egregious violations cited in the complaint.137 
 
The court then looked at the question of whether BP could escape 
possible liability by using the phrase “management believes” and the 
qualifier “material compliance,” addressing the district court's finding that 
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the statement was too “vague and ambiguous” to support the allegation of 
falsity.138  While the court noted those terms weigh against falsity, it stated it 
could not find any facts supporting management's “belief” in material 
compliance given the severity of the violations of environmental law, of 
which management was aware.139  The court held the fact of ongoing 
“discussions” with regulators was insufficient to foster a belief in “material 
compliance.”140  Thus, the court concluded the falsity of this statement was 
adequately pled.141 
 
To determine whether there was a strong inference of scienter, the 
court applied the Berson absurdity test to determine whether it would be 
absurd to suggest BP's management was unaware of BP's non-compliance 
with environmental laws and regulations.142  The court noted the complaint 
established the prominence of the issue of compliance: the complaint 
referenced the fact the annual report discussed the spill and the CAO, as well 
as the fact BP's then CEO requested updates on the company's response to the 
spill.143  The court also noted the magnitude of the violations, the significant 
public attention on BP following the spills, and the existence of 
contemporaneous documents which demonstrated management's awareness 
of BP's non-compliance with the CAO.144  On those grounds, the court held it 
was absurd to claim management was not aware of BP's significant, ongoing 
compliance issues that made the statement misleading.145 
 
The court also held the language in the annual report contradicted an 
inference of non-culpability.146  The opinion notes the language alerts 
investors about the potential for future compliance issues to have an adverse 
impact on the company, but puts the emphasis on unpredictable risks that 
would not disproportionately affect BP, while denying belief in risks unique 
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to the company in the spill's aftermath.147  The court held that in this context, 
the statement appears to be made with the intent to downplay BP's non-
compliance with existing laws and regulations.148  As such, there is a strong 
inference of an intent to mislead investors regarding the March spill that is as 
compelling as the opposing possibility that BP's top management lacked 
information about the company's compliance problems.149 
 
Thus, the court reversed the trial court with respect to all but one of 




The immediate consequence of this appellate decision is to revive 
shareholders’ securities fraud claims against BP.  Based on the court’s 
discussion of falsity and scienter with regards to BP’s statements, it seems 
likely that on remand a trial court will now find BP liable for violation of § 
10b of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (assuming the other elements of 
a 10b claim are met).151  Should the trial court find BP liable, BP’s damages 
could equal the entire loss incurred in the value of class members’ stock in 
BP during the class period (i.e. in the wake of the spills) if the plaintiffs can 
prove full loss causation.  The spills and resultant shutdown of production 
allegedly caused a four percent decline in BP’s share price.152  Since the class 
of plaintiffs includes pension and trust funds and investment banks,153 which 
likely own large quantities of BP’s stock, the potential damages could be 
quite significant.   
 
This ruling serves to compound BP’s extensive legal problems 
extending from the 2006 Alaskan oil spills and other spills, most notably the 
2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico, for which BP was 
also at fault.154  One can expect BP’s reputation to suffer again following a 
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finding of liability in this case, among both investors and the public at large, 
as it did after the Deepwater Horizon spill.  However, it will by no means 
break BP, especially considering the fact that the Deepwater Horizon spill, 
which was much larger and more economically and environmentally harmful, 
did not do so either. 
 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reached this decision by 
following, and ultimately strengthening, precedent from other cases dealing 
with the issue of securities fraud.  This case is environmentally significant 
because it is one of relatively few cases in which a set of environmentally 
relevant facts was at the core of securities fraud litigation.  Noteworthy is the 
fact this is the first case in which the Ninth Circuit applied the Berson 
absurdity test to such a set of environmental facts,155 which widens the 
breadth of possibilities for showing scienter in this type of securities fraud 
case in the future. 
 
The Ninth Circuit Court’s application of precedent was proper here, 
as the facts strongly suggest BP and its executives were dishonest with 
regards to the spills at issue.  The relevant public statements were either false 
or materially misleading to investors and the rest of the public. The most 
likely inference from the facts is that the statements were intentionally 
dishonest, as opposed to the weak inference that the statements were simply 
uninformed. 
 
In Reese, the court weighed the policy interest of holding companies 
accountable for knowingly making false statements to investors against the 
high evidentiary burden for showing such statements were known to be false 
at the time they were made and that the statements were made with the intent 
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to deceive or mislead investors.  The court looked at the evidence of 
securities fraud, direct and circumstantial, raised by the appellants and 
balanced this against the possibility that the appellees’ statements were 
unintentionally false.  Ultimately, the court correctly decided in favor of 
holding companies accountable for lying to investors, holding that BP’s and 
its employees’ statements were actionable. 
 
By this ruling, the court upheld the idea that companies that harm the 
environment, and then lie about it, should be held liable for their fraudulent 
behavior and for the harm to the environment itself.  The ruling in Reese 
serves as a warning to companies making statements about their 
environmental impact, and more generally, to companies whose activities 
have an impact on the environment.  Specifically, the ruling is useful and 
cautionary for companies who have a knowledgeable, on-the-ground 
manager or executive charged with making statements to the public 
concerning operations and policy.  However, perhaps the most consequential 
portion of the Ninth Circuit’s holding concerns the statements made in BP’s 
annual report (“Management believes that the Group's activities are in 
compliance with in all material respects with applicable environmental laws 
and regulations”).  This statement was most likely simple boilerplate 
language, and yet the court held it was actionably deceptive, notwithstanding 
the veil of qualifiers like “management believes” and “all material respects.”  
Companies must now be very careful when making such broad, standardized 
statements to investors as such provisions may still be actionable.  On the 
other side of the issue, ideally, investors can have more confidence with their 
investments.  Specifically, investors and the rest of the public should now be 
able to have more faith in the assertions of publicly traded companies. 
 
One can see how such qualifying language could have made the 
statement in BP’s annual report not actionable with regards to scienter; or 
how Johnson’s statements distinguishing the WOA and EOA lines were not 
misleading because the lines’ similarities were a matter of public knowledge, 
as the defense argued. However, the court held otherwise.  One can also see 
how the defense’s other arguments could also be plausible: it is possible 
Johnson and other BP executives did not have full access to the relevant or 
most recent data, or misinterpreted that data, and it is possible that some of 
the statements at issue were based only on preliminary assessments or were 
otherwise incomplete.  However, the appellate court was correct in 
remanding the case so that a trial court may determine the facts of the matter. 





Through its holding in Reese, that BP’s statements to the public and 
shareholders are actionable as securities fraud, the Ninth Circuit won an 
indirect victory for the environment.  This decision means BP’s attempts to 
cover up its fault in harming the environment are now a potential source of 
liability for BP.  Based on the court’s analysis of the issues, it is likely a trial 
court will find BP liable in this case.156  One can only hope this will deter 














                                                
156At the time of publication, this case has not yet gone to trial.  
